Vnivfrsilv aj tlliiidi.s riiis paper considers somi: jiamc-lhcorclic aspects of malching pmblcnis and pruci-'duics. of the sorl wliich involve matching Ihe members of one group of agents wiih one or more members of a second, disjoinl group (>f agents, all of whom have preferences over the possible resulting matches. The main foeiis of [his paper is mi determining lhe e,\lenl lo which maiching procedures ean be designed whicli give agents the ineenlive to honeslK reveal thenpreferences, und which produce stable matches.
arc then assigned accortling tt) some spcuificd algorilhm (as iti the procedure b \ which graduating medicai students in the United States are matched with the hospitals at whieh they complLMe Ihcir Irainingt. The main fncus of this paper wiil be on determining (he extent to which niatchini; procedures can be dcsignetl which liivx-agents tlic incentive lo honcstl\ rc\x'al then-preferences, and which produce stable niatclies. ' I wo principal rcstiUs wiil be demonstrated, I he lirst is thai no matching prciccdtirc exists which always vieltls a stable otitcotnc and gives players the incentive to reveal their true preferences, even though jirocedures exist which accomplish either of these goals separateK. The second result i,s that matching procedures do exist, howe\'ct\ which always yield a stable outcome atid which aK\ays give all the agents in one of the two disjoitit sets oi agents the incentive to reveal tlieu" true preferences. That is, it is pcissibic tt) find matching procedures which produce stable outcomes and which confine to one of the two kinds of agents being matched an_\-possible incentive to misrepresent their trtie preferences. For instance, iti a matching problem which involves matcliing individuals v\ith institutions, stable matching procedures e,xist which give every individual the incentive to reveal his Irue preferences. Why this might be a desirable propert\ of matching procedLires will be discussed.
The first result is similar in spirit to a numbcf of impt)ssibilitv results wiiich have beeti encountered by investigators seeking to design nt)ndictatoriar social-clu)ice procedures which operate in fairl>' iitirestricted tlotnains (cf, Gibbard (1973) or Satterthwaitc (1975) ), The second result shows that, by exploiting the structLtrc associated with the problem, it may be possible to confine lhe difficulties associated with misrepresentation of preferences tt) a manageable subset of the agents in\t)l\ed.''' l o g c t h e r . the two results will permit us to draw some ct)nclusit)ns about "t)ptimar' matching procedures from the pt)int t)f view t)f somet)ne trying to Tninnnize the incentive tt) misrepresent preferences.
l h e difficulties a,sst)ciated with misrepresentatitin are t)f not t)nly theoretical interest, but alst) of ct)nsiderable practical concern. \'or instance, in the early 195t)\. problems asst)ciatcd with the incentives for misreprescntalion in an earlier prt)ccdurc motivated a ct)mplete revision of the matching prt)ccdtire emplosed by the Natii,)nal Intern antl Resident Matching Program ( N I R M P ) . which is the program thrtuigb wiiicli most graduating medical doctors and htispitals are matched in the l.nited States. A future paper is planned to discuss the N I R M P prt)ccdure.
In the next sectit)n, a forma! model t)f matcliing problems is introduced, >?3 reviews the strtictttre t)f the set tif stable t)iiicomes for such i")rt)blems. which lias been well knt)wn smce the work t)f Cjalc and Shaple> (1962) . §i;4 thrt)tigh 6 prcscnl the anaKsis t.)r the incentive properties of matching procedures, and §7 concludes, 2. Tlie fornuil model. We begin b\' introducing a specialized mt)dcl t)f the matcliing prt)blcm, which will turn t)ut tt) be sufficiently general tt) tise tt) cxpltM'e the general prtiblcm. The simplest matching prt)blem io model is the "marriage problem," which ct>nsists of twti sets t)f agetlts ,V/ =^ [ ni ^ //;" l and H'^ | iv,, . , . , it;, [ {"men" aiui "vvt)men'"). luich m^ in M has a complete and transitive strict preference rclatit)n Pim,)
•".A ^t . l b l e m a t c h w i l l l i e i . l e f m e d ; i s a m . i i c h -u p o \ a g e n t ' ; s u c h t h a i n o p i i i r o l a j^e i U s w m i k i h o l h p r e f e r l o b e m a t c h e d i o e a c h o t h e r t h a n l o I h e i r c t i r r e i i l p a r t n e r s . S u c h a i n a l c l i i s i n l h e c o r e o f l h e e o o p e r a t i w g a m e w h i c h w o u l d r e s u l t il l h e i i u l i v i d u a l a g e n t s v \ e i ' e a b l e i o f r e e l \ n e g o t i a t e i h e i i o v \ ' n m a t c h e s , W h \ i h i s k i n d o f s i a h l e m a t c h m i g h t h e a d e s n a h l e o u t c o m e e v e n o l | " > r o c e t l t i r e s i n w h i c h I h i s i> n o t t h e c a s e w i l l h e i l i s e i i s M : i , i .
• | n l h e c o i i t e M o f m a t t ' h i n g , i h v r e q u i r e m e n i t h a i a n i a l u h i n g [ " i r o e c i l n i e _\ j e k l a l i a b l e o i n c o m e i s a s h ' o n g f o r m o f t h e r e L | i n r e n i e n l t h a i l l h e n i i i i d i c t [ i i o r i a l .
•' l h e a l t e r n a i i \ " e a p p r o a c h v v h i e l i h a s b e e n l a k e n i n l h e s o c i a l i,'luiiL'e l i l e r a U i r e i s t o l o o k l o r r c s u i t l i o n s o n [ h e a l l o w a b l e [^r e f e r e n c e s o f t h e a g e n i s w h i e l i w i l l j i e r m i t p o s s i l i i l i t \ i c s i i h s . S e e , f o r ( . • s a m p l e , K a l . i i a n d M n l l e r ( 1 9 7 7 ) . M a s k i i i { l ' ) 7 ( i | , R i l / { I ' -' . S I ) . ( o n c l n s i o i i s r e l a t e d l o l l i e SI.'L'OIK1 r e s i i l ( p i e s e n t e d h e r e h a v e r e e e i i t l _ \ b e e n d e N ' e l o ] i e d i n ( . l e p e n i , ! e n t l > b > t " ) u b i n s a i u l r r e e d m a n ( 1 9 8 0 ) . defined on IV. When no coni'usion will occur, Fim^) will sometimes be written as /*,; thus (he statement "viy is preferred by tn^ to %v" can be written as u'^ P(m^)\v^ or w)^ Fyy^. Each M; in W has a similar preference P{^v,) defined on A / / Denote by F (F{m^}, . . . . F{\vJ) the 2n-veetor of all the agents* preferences, which will sometimes be referred to as ihc preference profile.
An outcome of the (monogamous) marriage problem is a one-to-one matehing of men and women, i.e., an invertibie funetion x:M^ W. An outcome .v can be denoted by . V ^ |(A«|..v(m|)), (m,,_v(in.) ) {in,^.x{m,^))\ where \{m^)=w^ is the woman matched with man «j,. and .v " '(iv^) ^ m^ is the man matehed with woman w^.
A matehing x is stable if no man and no woman who are nctt matched to eaeh other at A prefer each olher to their partners at x. That is. .v is stable if there is no man m, and woman w such that both (i) vv,/,A- (/j;,) and
If a pair m^^ and M' do exist satisfying (i) and (ii). then v is unslablc with respeet to /nâ nd H . The motivation for [his terminology should be clear, and it is easily verified that the set of stable outcomes is equal to the eore ()\ the cooperative game which results if any man and woman may marry if they both agree (and in which each agent's preference for an outcome is delermined solely by his preference for potential partners).
The marriage problem as outlined above differs from Ihe general matehing problem in three principal respeets. First, in the marriage problem, eaeh agent is to be matehed with exactly one partner, but in the general matching problem, different agents may need to be matched with different numbers of partners, sii that eaeh agent has a "quota." and an otitcome is a function which matches eaeh agent with his quota of partners.'' Tor o\xv purposes, this differenee between the marriage problem and the general matching problem turns out to be of no eonsequenee. since al! the arguments whieh will be used ean he carried over virtually unchanged to the general case. Seeond, the marriage problem was defined as having equal numbers of men and women, and without the possibility that a feasible outcome eouid leave any agent unmatched, while in the general matehing problem, there may be an excess of t)ne kind of agent, and an outcome need not make a mateh for every agent. This more general ease can be handled by adding suitable "dummy" agents corresponding to the t>ption of being unmatehed in the final outc(.>me. The third respect in whieh the marriage prtibiem as described above is more restrictive than the genera! matching problem is that indifference between potential partners has been ruled out by the assumption that all preferences are strict. Relaxing ihis assumption would actually complicate some of the results. To avoid these complications, only striet preferences will be considered.
Thus the marriage problem will be used to represent the genera! matching problem with strict preferences. This should not obseure the faet that much of the interest of thê Thai IS, Ihc p r e f e r e n c e r e l a d o i i s l'[ii<,) ( o r P | i v , ) i h a v e t h e rollowinii p r o p e i i i c s :
(1) I r a n s i t i v i t v : il' H ' , / ' , " '^ : i n d ir^/'^ir^, iheii u'./'^u^: (2) c o n i p l e t e n e s s ; \OT all J i s l i n e i ir^. \\\ in W, e x a c l l v o n e ul" ilie rekiUuiis ii'^P.h^ o r w^ P^w, jioids riie iiileipreiaUoii of t h e p r e f e r e n c e r e l a l i o n s F. a s siriel p r c l e r e i u c r o l a i u m s m e a n s l h a l w e a r e r u l i n g o u l ihe possibililv t h a i a n a g e n t will b e i n d i f f e i e n i b e i w e e n t w o p o t e n l i a l p a r t n e r s , ( A l s o , ii is iievcr ilic e a s e i h a l »",/'jM-^.| S e e ilie tliscus^Kui a t t h e eiul nT this seeHon.
' ' N o l e l h a l . in Ihe g e n e r a l ease, i h o faci Ihat e a c h a g e n t ' s p r e f c r e n e e s a r e tiefmeil o v e r iiulividnal a g c n i s wilh w h o m h e m i g h l b e m a l e h e d m e a n s ihai i h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of a p a r l i e i i l a r i n a i e h is n o i a f t e e t e d b \ i h e oilier i n a l e h e s m a d e . T h u s , for e \ a n i p l e , a college's d results to be presented derives from matehing problems which are not marriage problems, since perhaps the most common kinds of matching problems are those whieh involve matching individuals wilh institutions, with the institutions having quotas greater than I. Ihe results which will be presented apply unchanged to these cases as well.
3. Tlie set of stable outcomes. This section reviews two surprising faets about the set of stable outcomes of matching problems, closely following the diseussion of these matters originally given by Gale and Shapley (1962) . First, the set of stable outc(.)mes of the general matching problem is always nonempty, i.e., regardless of the preferences o{ the players, at least one stable outct)me always exists. Second, for each of the two disjoint sets of agents, there always exists a stable outcome which is preferred lo all other stable outcomes by every member of that set of agents.
As discussed in the previous section, it will be sufficient to prove both results for the ease of the marriage problem. It will be eonvenient to refer to the agents M \m^ m,,! a n d H'= [w^ \x\/i as " m e n " a n d " w o m e n , " respectively.
TTirORFiM I. riw .set of stable outcomes is always nonempty.
F(.)llowing Gale and Shapley (1962) the proof proeeeds by displaying a procedure which, for arbitrary preferences of the agents, constructs a stable outcome. The proeedure works as follows:
.
Step I. (a) Each man proposes lo his most pieferred woman.
(b) Bach woman rejects all but her most preferred of the men who have proposed, and keeps the most preferred man as her suitor.
Step k. (a) Iiach man who has been rejected in the previous step proposes to the most preferred of those women who have not yet rejected him (i.e., to whom he has not yet proposed).
(b) Laeh woman keeps as her suitor the man she most prefers among those who have prt)posed (including the man she kept as her suitor at the end of step A: -I), and rejeets the rest.
The procedure terminates al the outcome which results when every woman has reeeived at least one proposal (at which point each woman has exactly one suitor). Since the sets of agents are finite, this always occurs in a finite number of steps. The resulting outcome is stable, since any woman preferred by a man to his own final partner has already rejected him, and henee prefers her final partner to him. This eompteles the proof.'
A specific reali/.ation of this repeated proposal procedure, when the preference profile of the agenis is P. will be denoted G(P). Thus we ean speak of the women proposed to, ov ihc men rejected, at any step k of GIF). The ouleome seleeted by this procedure when the preference profile is P will be denoted g{P). Gale and Shapley also proved the following.
2. There is a .stable ouleome weakly preferred bv every man to any other .stable outcome and one weakly preferred by every woman.
PRoor. We will show thai the stable outcome g(P) is weakly preferred hy every man to every other stable outcome, i.e.. that for any other stable outcome, every man either gets a less desirable mateh than at g{P). or else gets the same partner at bolh <.)utcomes. The symmetry of the problem then implies that the eorresponding outeome " riie only adjustinonl whieh wonki be needed lo handle llie general case m which each agoni is lo be malehed to some quota of parlncrs would be lhal each man proposes lo Ins full cpiota al eaeh slep. and each woman rejecls men onlv when her quoia is full.
for the women can be conslrucled by exchanging the roles of M and W in the repeated proposal procedure, i.e., by having women propose, and men accept or reject.
For each man m,. call a woman w-possible for /«, if there is some stable outcome x for which xim^) = w^. Suppose that, up to step A--I of the procedure GiP).. no man has been rejected by a possible woman, and that, at step k. /«, is rejected by w^. Then if we show that w-is not possible for m,, we will have shown by induction that no man is ever rejected by a possible woman (at any step of GiP)). which is sufficient to complete the proof.
Let m, be the man who w^ did not reject at step k. Then w^ prefers tui to m,, and my prefers H' to any w, who hasn't already rejected him. By the inductive assumption, this means m, prefers w. to any (other) H; who is possible for him. So any outcome which pairs m-and w^ and pairs m, with a woman who is possible for him, is unstable with respect to m^ and w^. So w isn't possible for m^, which completes the proof.
So far we have discussed the repeated proposal procedure introduced in Gale and Shapley (1962) simply as an algorithm which permits a constructive proof of certain propositions about stable outcomes.*^ The next section C(.)ncerns questions which arise if we wish to consider the possibility of actually implementing some matehing procedure as a mechanism for resolving matching problems, or if we wish to evaluate the effects of some procedure already in use.
Incentives and stability.
Since eaeh agent alone knows his own preferences, any matching procedure whieh depends on agents' preferences can be thought of as consisting of two parts: a mechanism for eliciting the preferences of the agents, and a mechanism for aggregating these elieited preferences to determine an outcome. This section is concerned with the question of what kinds of matching procedures, if any, can be designed so as to give the agents the incentive to reveal their true preferences."' If a procedure docs not give the players the incentive to reveal their true preferences, then the resulting outcome may not possess certain desirable properties even if the aggregation mechanism produces outcomes which always possess these properties with respect to the stated preferenecs.
A different kind of problem concerning incentives arises for matehing procedures which do not result in stable outcomes, sinee such procedures give at least one pair of agents the incentive to disregard the matching procedure, and seek an aUernalive outcome. Of course, it may be possible to compel the agenls to accept the outcome, in spite of these incentives. For instance, the procedure by which some high school athletes are matched with colleges involves signing "letters of intent," after which athletes are effectively prohibited from further negotiating with other schools. (Professional athletes in several sports are matched with teams under an even more restrictive draft, which prevents a player from negotiating with any team but the one which drafts him.) However in situations in whieh compulsion plays no part, it is desirable ft)r a matching procedure to yield stable outcomes. A procedure whieh does so for arbitrary preference profiles will be called a .stable matching procedure.
•^These results h:tvf been genorali/.cd in an ilkiniinaling papci-liv CVawlord atid Knoer (I9SI) m a class of labor markets jn which wages arc dclermined as part of the matching process. Thcv itiuodticc a "salaiv adjustment p r o c e d u r e " which operates in much the same wa> as Ihe repeated proposal procedure. Ritz (1982) demonstrates generalizatidns of ihese results and Ihose oliiaincd in H on a wide rcialed class of iwo-sidcd markets. Knuth 11976) Further discusses tlie struclure of the set of siable oulconies, and discusses computational features of various proeedures.
Thus, in a eenirali/cd procednre which elicits preferences by asking the agents io rank-order ihcir preferred matches, we wish to know if proeedures can be designed which give agenls the iiicL-niivc lo rank the alternatives according lo their true preferences. In a decL-niralized procedure which elieits preferences through ihe agenl's actions (e.g., by supposing tliat men propose lo iheir must preferred woman), we wish lo know if proeedures can be designed which give agents the incentive to aci in ihis slraighlforward manner.
Before proceeding further with this discussion, we need lo make precise what is meant b\ a procedure whieh gives agents an ineeiUive to reveal their Irue preferences. Onee a given meehanism for aggregaling slated preferenees is adopted, the matehing problem becomes a noncooperalive game among the agents, whose payoff eonsists oi the outcome which results, and whose strategy choices consist of what preferences lo Slate (or aet according to. el, footnote 9), Here we define a proeedure whieh gives the agents the incentives to reveal their true preferences as one which aggregates slated preferences in a manner such that, in ihe resulting noncooperative game, it is a dominant strategy for each player to state his preferences honestly.'*' In sueh a procedure, no matter whal preferences other players may state, a player who misrepresents his preferenees ean achieve no better outcome than if he had stated ihem correelly, and he may. o!" course, do worse,"
Ihe following result may now be stated: no stable matching [procedure for the general matching problem exists which gives all the players an incentive to reveal their prefereticcs,
Tiii'ORi'M 3, No stable matching proeedure for the general matching probletn exists for which truthful revelation of preferenees is a ilommanl slralegv for all agctvs.
It will be sufficient to demonstrate thai a matching problem exists lor whieh no stable matching procedure has trulhful revelation as a dominanl strategy. Let Ihe iwo sets of agents be M -| w,,/'/,./n, 1 and H ' -(iV|.vv;. iv-,,1. Let h be an arbitrary slable matching proccdtire which, for any slated preference profile /' selects some outcome h{P) contained in the set <:~(/^) of outeomes which lire stable with respect to the preference profile /'. Stippose that the preferences of the players are g i v e n b y t h e p r e f e r e n c e p r o f i l
e F = { P ( m , ) , P { m . \ P { m : , ) . P { w , ) . P { w . ) . P ( w , ) ) d e f i n e d as follows:'"

P{w~.y. m-^P^tii^P.nu. P{w,): tu^P-.,m2P:nr, .
Then t h e set of s t a b l e ( u i t e o m e s is {:-(/^) -j.v -[ ( / H i . v v , ) . ( m ; , v v , ) , ( / H , . M ' | ) ] . r = [{m^ ,w^),{m.,w,).{m,.w.)\ ].
h a t is, tins p r e t e r e n c e profile h a s e x a c t l y two s t a b l e o u t c o m e s : the o u t c o m e x, w h i c h m a t c h e s /n, with w-,, tn-, with iv., a n d tn-.. with iv,, a n d the o u t c o m e r, w h i c h m a t c h e s
/Hi with vV|. m , wiih iv,, a n d m, with w.. N o l e that the m e n prefer A w h i l e the w t i m e n prefer v (with m. a
n d iv, indifferent). S i n e e /( is a s t a b l e m a t c h i n g p r o c e d u r e . h{P)
e q u a l s e i t h e r v ovy.
' " W h e n ; i i i \ p o s s i h l c I n i c p r e f c i o n c c s m a v oL-cLir, a n o q u i v ; t l c n i d c h n J I J o n is i h a l A p i o c c d u r c W I I K I I g i v cî lic a i i c n l s a n i n c o n u v c l o r o \ c a l ittoir i r u c prcfcrcnt.-i.-s is one iii w h i c h , ui t h e r c s i i l l i n i ; n o n c o o p c n i i i v i : sianic, ,\ IS a l w a y s a N a s h c i i u i l i h n i i m i o r all I h c p l a v c r s l o s l a l e I h c i r i r u e p r e f e r e n c e s icf D.isgLipia, H a m m o n d , n t u i M a s k i n ( r ) 7 ' ) ) ) .
" A l l jiKl^iiiciils :ihoLil v \ h c l h e i a n a,i!ciit likes o n e o u l c o i n e b c l l c i i h a n a n o l l t e i ' m u s l o l n u H i s l y b e m a d e m I c r n i s of I h e ii,^eIl^s friie p r e f e r e n c e s , '-'1 h a i IS, « i | p r e f e r s » . l o .^ , l o .1 -,: ni. a n d i}i-p r e f e r u', h-w , l o w^: u , p r e f e r s »}, In » ( , to ' / ( . . e l c .
N o w s u p p o s e t h a t , i n s t e a d of the p r e f e r e n c e relation P{^^•^). vv, i n s t e a d s t a l e d the a l t e r n a t i v e p r e f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n P'{w^} given by Let P'^{P{m^lP{m.),P{m^),P'{w^),P(w.).P{wy))
be the preference profile which differs from P only in that P'{wy) replaces P(w^). Then the outcome v is the unique stable outcome with respect to the preference profile P\ i,e.. the set of stable outcomes is C{P') = { y]. Sinee /? is a stable matching procedure. h{P') = y. Similarly, let P" be the preference profile which differs from P only in ihal P " ( m | ) replaces P{m^), where P"{mf} is given hy Then the outcome .v is the unique stable outcome with respect lo P\ i,e,, CiP") -!A-[. and so h{P") -.v.
So if, in the original problem, h{P) equals v, then u-, has an incentive to state the preference relation F'(vV|) instead of (he true preference P{w^), in order to change the outcome from x loy (which changes w/s partner from /», to in^). And if, instead. h{P) equals y, then it is mj who has an incentive to niisrepre.sent his preferences as P"ini^). to change the outcome from v to h{P") = x. Since h was an arbitrary stable matching procedure, this completes the proof.
To see the role played by stability in Theorem 3, observe (hat there are efficient matehing procedures, i.e., proeedures whieh always yield Parelo optimal (but not necessarily stable) outcomes, which do not give players any incentive to misrepresent their preferenees.
TMI;ORFM 4. Effieienl matching procedures exist for which truthful revelation of preferences is a dominanl strategy for every agent.
Consider the procedure which, for any stated preference profile P. yields the outcome/(/') ^ x in which Aim,) is the most preferred partner of m^. and .v(mj is the most preferred partner of m^ in the set W\\x{m^)
x(m^ | ) | for A" = I m. That is, this procedure matches m, with his (stated) first choice, m> with his (stated) first choice of the remaining w,, and so forth. Truthful revelation of preferences is clearly a dominant strategy for the men, and it is also a (degenerately) dominant strategy for the women, whose preferences have no influence on the outcome of this proeedure (which bears some resemblance to the football draft). Although the outeome^P) need nol be stable, it is always Pareto optimal with respect to P. since at any other outcome some man would do worse. This completes the proof.
So there are matching procedures which always yield stable outeomes, and there are efficient matehing procedures in which truthful revelation is a dominant strategy for every agent, but no matching proeedure exists whieh meets both these requirements. However, it is possible to find stable matching procedures which confine any ineentive for misrepresentation to either one of the two sets of agents, and whieh eonstrain the scope for misrepresentation by (hose players. Specifically, we will prove the following results, which make use of the fact that Theorem 1 permits us to identify, for each set of agents, a unique optimal stable outeome, which they each like at least as well as any other stable outeotne. Note ihal bolh ieMills arc phrased hi terms of "ihe" matching procedure which yields a parlicular outcome. There are obviously different procedures which yield the same oulcome. bul from the point of view of incentivies such procedures are equivaIciil. and can be regarded as a single procedure. Note also thai Theorem 5 implies ihat, although an agent can in general change the set of stable outcomes by misrepresenting his preferences, no agenl ean manipulate his preferences in sueh a way that he prefers his best oulcome in the altered set of stable outcomes to his best outcome in the original set of stable outcomes. The next section is devoted U) the proof of these results, vvhieh is somewhat more eomplex than the proof of ihe earlier results. §6 presents some additional results about the structure of the set of stable outcomes, which arise in the course of the proofs.
Proofs of Tlieorem 5 and its corollary.
In this section it will be shown that the repeated proposal procedure G used in the proof of Theorem ! has the properties stated in Theoretn 5 and Corollary 5.1. As discussed m seetion 2, lo establish these results for the general matching probletn with strict preferences, it will be sufficient to demonstrate iheni for the marriage problem. Throughout this section, therefore, the sels of agents will be M -[m^ m,,] a n d W ^ \w^ w,, |, the true preferences of the players will be given by the arbitrary preference profile /*, and x ^ giP) will denote (he oulcome which results from the repeated proposal procedure when the true preferences are stated.
To prove Theorem 5, we need to show that truthftil revelation is a dominant strategy for each m^ in M. Since the (true) preference profile P is arbitrary, it will be sufficient tti show that, if P' is a prcferenee profile which differs from P oniy in ihat P'im,). ^^V-replaces man m's true preferences P(m,). then man m, doesn't prefer the outcome , • = giP') to A = giP)-That is, we need to show that no successful misrepresentation t)f preferences is possible, where a misrepresentation P'{m,) is defined to be a successful misrepresentation by man m, \\ yini,)P(m,)x{m,).
Ihat is. a misrepresentation P'im,) is successful if m, prefers (according to his Irue preferences) the partner v(m,) he's matched with when he misrepresents his preferenees to the partner x(m,) he's matched with when he stales his true preferenees. (Throughout this section. y == ^(/>') will denole an outcome resulting from misrepresenlation by m,.)
We firsi show that only a certain kind of simple misrepresentalion need be considered, since if any successful manipulalion is possible, then it can be achieved by a simple misrepresentalion. Specifically, if P'(m,) is an arbitrary misrepresentation as discussed above, then an equivalent simple misrepresentation P"im-) is one in which yim,)P"(mfw for all w) -yim,). Thai is. P"{m,) is a preference relation whieh has v(w,) as the most preferred maieh of m,. The justification for calling P"(m,) an equivalent misrepresentation to P'(m^) is given by the following lemma, which slates that m, will end up matched lo the same partner. v(m,). whether he misrepresents using P'im^) or P" (m,) . (The preference profile P". of course, denotes the one which differs from P only in that P"im^) replaces P{m-).
L i i M M A 1. If V = '^(P') a n d z -g ( P " \ t h e n z ( m^)^ y ( m ) .
PROOI . The outcome v is slable with respeci to the preference prt)file P" (i.e.. r is in C(P")'). sinee y is in C'iP') and sitiee no new potential instabilities for v arise in changing from P' to P\ So y{m,) is "possible" for m, under the preference profile P", in the sense defined in the proof of Theorem 2. Since r(m,) is m/s mosi preferred match aeeordini; to P"(mX it is the best possible match for m, with respect to P '. But.
by Theorem 2, J = g{P") gives every man his bcsl possible malch with respect lo the profile P", and so z(m,) = ylm^) as was lo be proved.
So Lemma 1 shows thai, to prove Theorem 5. it is sufficient to prove lhal no simple misrepresentation P'{mf) (i.e.. no manipulation in which m^ proposes lo v{m,) in slep I of G(P')) can be successful. The following lemma states lhal if a misrepresenlalion by m, leaves m,. at least as well off as at .v ^ g(P)-then no man will suffer, i.e., every man likes the outcomef = g{P') resulting from the misrepresentation at least as well as the outcome x = g{P). Suppose, lo (he contrary, ihat x{m^)Pim^}ylm^) for some m^ in /V/. i.e.. i>id oes worse in the outcome r than in .v. Since every agent other than m, states the same preferences in the profiles P and P\ it must be that m^ is rejeeted by x(m ) at some step of the procedure G{P'). Let / be the //>.S7 step of G{P') at which some m is rejected by .v(m^). Then .v(m^) musl have received a proposal in step / of G(P') from some m^ who did twi propose to her in GiP). such that A??,^/'(,x-(m^))/?; . i.e., from an mŵ ho x(m^) prefers to m^. The fact that m^ didn't propose to A(m^) in G{P) means -x:(mJP(mJx(m^). and so m^^ must have been rejected by .v(w^) in G{P') prior to step /, which contradicts the ehoice of / as the firsi such period. Consequently, no m is rejected by x(m^) in G{P').. which completes ihe proof.
We can now proceed to prove Theorem 5, by showing that no man can successfully misrepresent his preferences in the repeated proposal procedure (in which men do the proposing).
PROOF OF TULORKM 5. Let x -g{P), and suppose that x results from the repeatedproposal procedure in t steps, i.e.. GiP) terminates at step /. Lei P' be the preference profile which results from P when one agent, m,. makes a simple misrepresentation to obtain v = g(P')-We want lo show that this misrepresentation cannot be successful, and we will proceed by assuming that either r(m,)/'(m,).v(w,) or v(m,)= x{m^) and then showing that only the latter alternative can occur. That is. we consider only manipulations which don't actually harm the manipulator, and then show that thev don't help him either.
For any m^ in M, say that m^ makes a match at .step k of G(P) if m^ proposes to his ultimate partner x(m^) at slep k. Note that each m^ makes a match exactly once. Now we will show that, for any m^ who makes a match al period t of G{P) (the final period), _v(m^) ^ .v(m^). This follows from the fact thai, smce / was the final step of G(P), m^ was the only man who proposed to x(ru^) in G(P) (since otherwise al least one more step would have occurred). Bui, by Lemma 2. no man does worse at v than at .V. so no man proposes to v(m,) in G{P') who didn't propose lo x{m ) in GiP). Consequently only m^ proposes to x{m^) in G(P') (since x{r)i^) receives at least one proposal), and soy{m^) = -v(m^). The same conclusion holds for any m who is the only one lo propose lo x{m^) in G(P), regardless of the period at which he makes his match. So if the manipulator m, made a mateh at the final slep / of G(/'). or if he made a mateh with someone who received no other proposals in GiP).. (hen his manipulation can't be successful, and we're tk>ne.
Suppose inslead that the manipulator m, makes a match at some other step k of G(P) (I <. k <.. I). We will show by induction that, for every in^ (including m,) who makes a match at step k or later, Y(m ) = x{m ).
Lei /• be a step of G(P) such that k K r <^ t. We have alreadv demonstrated the desired conclusion for any lu^ who makes a match at step /. The inductive part of the proof is to show that, \iy{in^) = x{m^) for every ni who makes a maicli at sleps / • olhcr m, 7^ m^ musl be matched wilh x{m ) al v (i.e., v(//;,) ^ x{m)}. Bui the fad lhal m, didn't propose lo .v(/j;^) in G{P) means in^ prefers .v(/?7,) to .v(/^/). which ctjmplctcs the proof.
Taken together. Thc(.)rcms 3 and 5 and Corollary 5.1 provide bounds on how much misrepresentation we can hope to preclude in any stable matching procedure. Theorem 3 shows that il isn't possible to remove all incentive for misrepresentation, but i^heorem 5 shows that such incentives can be removed from one of the two sels of agents, and Corollary 5.1 shows that the incentive to misrepresent can simultaneously be somewhat constrained in the other set of agenis. In fact, the procedure discussed in Theorem 5 and its corollary lake us as far as we can go in this direction. The following resuli formahzes the sense in which this is the case.
Tiii:()Ri;M 7. No .stable matehing procedure exists which never gives any agent an incentive lo misrepresent his klh choice, for k ^ \.
PROOF. The result follows from the proof of Theorem 3. Examples of the kind used there can obviously be constructed, such that an ageni in one of the two sets will have an incentive to misrepresent his Ath choice, for any k -\.
7. Discussion. The theorems presented in § §3, 4 and 6 demonstrate that the structure of the matching problem allows powerful conclusions lo be drawn about the sel of possible outcomes and the procedures which can be used to select a particular outcome. Consider, for example, the matching problem which involves studenls and colleges; specifically, the problem of matching sludcnts with the colleges at which ihey will matriculate.
Theorem 1 shows that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty, so that, when the preferences of students for colleges and colleges for students are known, it i.s always possible lo assign students to colleges in a way whieh gives colleges the incentive to admit the students they were assigned, and students ihe incentive to attend the college to which they were assigned, since neither can hope to find a more preferable match. Furthermore. Theorem 2 shows that the set of stable outcomes has a structure which reflects common interests of studenls or of eolleges. It is somewhat surprising that common interests of this kind can be identified, since the nature of the problem is that students compete witli each other for the best (i.e.. the most widely preferred) colleges, and colleges compete with eaeh other for the best students. Bui when attention is confined to the sel of stable outcomes, these eauses of competition and conflicting interests disappear, and all students have a common interest in the "student-optima!" stable outcome, while all colleges prefer the "coilege-optinial" stable outcome. Theorem 6 shows that this common interest is not in conflict with the requirement of stability, i.e.. even if stability were not required, students could not all do better than the student optimal stable outcome.
A similar structure remains when, in ^4. the assumption that the preferences are known is abandoned. Although "Fheoreni 3 shows that it isn't po.ssible lo find a stable matching procedure which doesn't potentially give some agent an incentive to misrepresent his preferences. Theorem 5 shows that it is possible to confine this incentive to misrepresent to either one of ihe two sets of agents. This latter result suggests that, despite the resuli of Theorem 3. it may be possible lo largely avoid the distortions introduced by misrepresentation in matching problems like the problem of matching students and colleges, in which one set of agents consists of institutions rather than individuals.'-'
In particular, suppose ihal the matching procedure is used which yields the .sludcntoplimal stable assignment of students to colleges, and whieh gives no student any ineentive to misrepresent his preferences. Sinee it is a dominant strategy for each student to reveal his true preferences, the only potential souree of distortion of the procedure lies in the stated preferenees of the colleges. But the preferenees of colleges (and institutions in general) are likely to be much more regular than the preferences of students (and individuals in general), so that colleges may have less set)pe for (undeteclabie) misrepresentation. For example, the kinds of preferences whieh colleges may exhibit are already influenced by legislation and regulaiion designed to eliminate racial di.scritiiination. The enforcement ol' these laws and regulations presupposes that the preferenees exercised by a college ean be examined (e.g.. through litigation) with sufficient reliability lo de(ermine which choices result from "legitimate" preferences and which from discriminatory preferences. And. to the extent that colleges rank students through objective criteria like grades or exam scores, the degree lo whieh "strategic" opportunities arise from misrepresentation of preferences over other factors IS redueed.
